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STEPHEN DANIELS: All right, I am going to use some visual aids 
because they help me think. I also have a few numbers, so that’s often 
easier to do with a visual presentation. I do want to say I may be the 
only nonlawyer that you’re going to hear from today. I’m a political 
scientist, so I study the politics of courts, tort reform. I’m going to 
talk about research my colleague Joanne Martin and I have been 
doing in Texas. One of the main areas we looked at is the impact of a 
$250,000 hard cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice 
cases. And we study plaintiffs’ lawyers; we wanted to know what was 
the impact on them of the cap? Because they’re the gatekeepers. You 
have a serious personal injury case, or almost any kind of damage 
case, [and] if you don’t have a lawyer, your rights aren’t worth 
anything. I don’t care what’s on the books or the like. Lawyers are the 
gatekeepers. If you’re a plaintiffs’ lawyer, it’s a contingency fee 
system. So if the lawyer can’t get something out of it, can’t make a 
living, again your rights don’t make any difference. 
And if you look at some of the real goals of caps in some states, it 
is to go after the plaintiffs’ lawyers, go after the people who bring the 
cases. You’ll have fewer cases whether you have a jury or not, but 
there are some other things that happen as well, and that comes from 
the title [on the slide being displayed] that we have, “The Juice Isn’t 
Worth the Squeeze in Those Cases Anymore.” That’s from a very 
experienced, successful plaintiffs’ side med mal specialist 
commenting on how he was going to change his practice after the cap. 
He was going to handle fewer medical malpractice cases, but equally 
important, he says, “I’m going to handle fewer cases with certain 
kinds of people: children who die or are killed by medical negligence, 
women, especially if they’re stay-at-home-moms (they don’t have an 
income), and the elderly.” What some people call the “hidden 
victims” of tort reform, especially with medical malpractice. 
All right, so this just a list of quotes from lawyers we interviewed 
in Texas, plaintiffs’ lawyers, but the idea is to get across that caps can 
have a serious impact on a lawyer’s practice; as a result, that means 
not just, again, fewer med mal cases, but fewer opportunities for 
access for certain kinds of people. 
“There’s no case in the system as expensive as medical 
malpractice.” 
 
product liability, Board of Director claims, premises liability claims, automobile and 
trucking claims, governmental liability claims, trademark and copyright claims, real 
property disputes, general liability claims, and business litigation. 
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“The hardest case to win at trial in Texas.” 
And if you look at win rates, in medical malpractice cases in 
Texas, if you can find a county of any size, going back a generation, 
even in the so-called “hey days” of plaintiffs’ lawyers in Texas, [and] 
find me a county that had a win rate, at trial, for medical malpractice 
above twenty-five percent—I’ll buy you dinner. 
One lawyer said, “Last year we spent in excess of $100,000 in 
cases that we didn’t take.” 
Screening is very severe, and it’s expensive. 
“We always escrow $300,000 for each case.” 
Put the money where you have it to have it. If you’re a plaintiffs’ 
lawyer, you lose. You eat the cases—you eat the cost. 
“You know, I think the most I’ve had invested in a medical 
malpractice case was around $600,000 or $700,000.” 
Luckily, he said, we won this one. But then, the kind of, the key, 
on this list: 
“There are many cases we can’t take that are legitimate cases, but 
they’re not economically viable because you’re going to spend more 
working up that case than you can hope to get under the caps.” 
For a while his practice was over ninety percent—med mal was 
over ninety percent of this practice. It went down to fifty percent, and 
this is one of the top med mal specialists in Texas after the turn of the 
century. 
“Basically, they’ve essentially closed the courthouse door to 
negligence that would kill a child, a housewife, or an elderly person.” 
“Unless there’s a way to make money practicing law, rights don’t 
make any difference.” 
And as my favorite title of a law review article done by David 
Hyman and Charlie Silver on medical malpractice [says], very simple, 
It’s the Incentives, Stupid.1 You go after the damages. You cut the 
available fee and recovery of costs for the plaintiffs’ lawyers. They 
cannot afford to take certain kinds of cases and certain kinds of 
clients. 
All right, median impact, practical implications—after a $250,000 
hard cap, do you get fewer medical malpractice cases? The answer is 
yes. Now, I have Harris County, which is Houston, here because you 
cannot get hard figures on filing statewide for medical malpractice 
 
1 David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice Litigation & Tort Reform: 
It’s the Incentives, Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085 (2006). 
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before 2010 in Texas. These—we were able to get from the clerk in 
Harris County. So in 1997 to 2002, the five years before the cap, you 
had an average of 435 malpractice cases filed in those five years, per 
year. After the cap, it’s cut almost in half. You want to look at jury 
trials in the last time period, the most recent, 2012 to 2016, there are 
an average of four to five med mal jury trial[s] in Harris County. If I 
go back to earlier data that we collected, for another project we had 
jury verdict data from Harris County for the five-year period 1981 to 
1985. There were five times more jury trials in the early 80s and far 
more cases filed. So, the median practical implication? Fewer cases. 
Real simple. 
But what about the hidden victims? One of the things we did in one 
of two surveys we did of plaintiffs’ lawyers in Texas—this was the 
second survey, in 2006—we wanted to find out about this hidden 
victims idea. So, we set up kind of a quasi-experiment in the survey, 
looking at whether they would take certain kinds of clients in two 
very different kinds of cases. We set the comparison up after 
consulting with about a dozen litigators in Texas to make sure we 
were kind of on the right track. But our potential clients were a 
seventy-year-old male, a forty-five-year-old male with children at 
home and a pretty good paying job, and a forty-five-year-old female 
who was working at home with kids—a stay-at-home mom, no 
income. We asked them whether they would take that—each of these 
clients—in an eighteen-wheeler crash case—big truck hits [a] car, lots 
of money. As one of the consultants we worked with said, “There’s a 
lot of meat on the bones in those cases,” and another said, “Even 
Republicans will vote for us on a jury in these cases.” So, this is a 
case—this is the “gimme.” And then the other was a med mal case. In 
each of them, there was a substantial amount of physical impairment 
and disfigurement, so you had your noneconomics in there for each. 
And so, we asked them, would you take each of these clients in the 
truck crash before the cap, and after? And in med mal before and 
after? We wanted to use the crash case because, you know, what’s 
kind of a control? Are these clients ever of interest to a plaintiffs’ 
lawyer? 
The answer is yes—both before and after the cap, they’d still take 
each of these clients almost all the time. 
We said, what about med mal? Would you take these clients in a 
med mal case before the cap? The answer is yes. Pretty much on an 
equal par with the truck crash case. But what about after the cap? And 
you can see the difference. A little over a quarter would take the 
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seventy-year-old male; a little over a third would take the stay-at-
home mom, but even still you only had just over two-thirds who 
would take the best client. So you have fewer med mal cases coming 
in and certain clients becoming almost toxic. And, in fact, for an 
elderly person, it was getting damned impossible when we 
interviewed lawyers, following up on this, to find anyone who would 
say they would take an elderly client, male or female. They just can’t 
afford the workup and the risk that’s involved when there are no 
noneconomic damages. The loss is too great; the risk is too high. 
Now, so those are the kind of practical implications we were 
interested in with these kind[s] of hidden victims who were taking the 
brunt of the caps. And there’s an interesting kind of equal protection 
idea in there: why should these people pay the price, so to speak, for 
the supposed gains of the cap in Texas? 
Now, but there is the question, practical implication, on the other 
side. Do the caps lower the cost—bend the cost curve—for medical 
care? The answer is no from the best empirical work out there, done 
by a team of researchers from the University of Texas, Illinois, and 
Northwestern, looking at Medicare cost figures and closed-claims 
data from the Texas Department of Insurance. Every year they put out 
a big data set on closed claims. That includes medical malpractice. 
The cost did not go down. 
Are more docs coming into the state? One of the big things: 
“We’re losing docs! We can’t get ‘em.” No. What about the unique 
specialties, neurosurgeons, OB/GYNs, and the like? No. “We’re 
getting more docs in rural areas, traditionally underserved.” No. So, 
the best empirical evidence says, in terms of practical implications, 
none of the stated goals were being hit. And, in fact, that same team 
of researchers also went back using closed-claims data to see, was 
there ever this big skyrocketing increase in noneconomic damages? 
And the answer was no. 
So, you’re looking at situation in which a lot of the political 
rhetoric got way ahead of the practicalities. You have fewer medical 
malpractice cases—if that was your goal, you’ve succeeded. You 
have fewer lawyers interested in taking these cases—was that your 
goal? You’ve succeeded. And, I’ll put my political scientist hat on, do 
you want to make it harder for your opponents to put larger amounts 
of money into political campaigns in Texas? You go after the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers, you’ve succeeded. Since the unions have started 
pretty much dying away, the single largest contributor to democratic 
candidates in the State of Texas, as in many other places, are 
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plaintiffs’ lawyers. So, if the idea is we want to go after the greedy 
plaintiffs’ lawyers—you wanna claw that money back that they’re 
taking from all of us—they’ve succeeded. 
But the question is why should some identifiable sets of people pay 
the price for those political goals? 
And the last thing, interesting, is [a] quote from Deborah 
Hankinson, a former member of the Texas Supreme Court. She was 
appointed by George W. Bush, Republican, in good standing to this 
day and, at one point in time, a proponent of tort reform. This cap 
drove her to the other side. And she had remarked 
“The [cap] amendment”— 
(–and again, this was done through a constitutional amendment, 
none of this, “let’s talk about Texas constitutional law now.” No 
subtlety here. Amend the constitution, overrule similar provisions to 
the one you have in Oregon about open courts and jury trials, and 
just do away with it altogether. For Justice Hankinson), “[the cap] 
amendment wasn’t designed to cut off bad—that is, frivolous—
lawsuits. It was designed to cut off lawsuits by people with legitimate 
claims by restricting access to the courthouse. This tort reform went 
too far . . . I view it as something that deprives people of their 
constitutional rights.”2 
So yes, it means fewer jury trials. It means fewer cases. But it also 
means that there’s an identifiable set of people who are paying the 
price. And if you go look at those closed-claims studies in Texas to 
see what the impact has been, especially on the elderly, far fewer 
claims are coming in, and when the elderly does get some money, it 
has gone way down. So it’s hit the elderly especially hard. 
So those are the kind of practical implications we’ve looked at in 
terms of lessons from Texas. As someone who does a lot of empirical 
work on this, I hate to say it, but in this environment the empirical 
work doesn’t make a damn bit of difference. 
CATHERINE SHARKEY: Thank you. I’m very pleased—I’m 
Catherine Sharkey, I’m from NYU—and I’m very pleased to be here 
today. I have two comments that I want to make and really just one 
issue that was briefly discussed in the first panel that I want to give a 
little bit more sustained attention to. 
So the two comments are first, drawing from Dean Chemerinsky’s 
wonderful opening and drawing it together with Justice Walters’ 
 
2 Mimi Swartz, Hurt? Injured? Need a Lawyer? Too Bad!, TEXASMONTHLY (Nov. 
2005), https://www.texasmonthly.com/politics/hurt-injured-need-a-lawyer-too-bad/. 
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lunchtime talk, about the, not only the ambivalence towards the civil 
jury, but I think Dean Chemerinsky was trying to encourage people to 
think constructively—what to do in the face of that. And I think 
Justice Walters gave a response, at least in terms of talking about 
some of the endeavors here, with the streamlined jury, expedited 
process, et cetera. 
So my thought, or comment, to add to that, is first. It is the case 
that at NYU we have this “Civil Jury Project.” And we realized, 
looking around, that there were many people who seem to be 
interested in juries. There’s more attention, I think, given to extolling 
its virtues in the criminal context, and that’s why our project is 
specifically the Civil Jury Project. And I think early on we realized 
that we could maybe serve as a kind of clearing house for people who 
are interested in the civil jury and in learning about various 
innovations that were going around nationwide. And we’ve been up 
and running a little over a year; Steve Susman founded, I mean 
funded, this organization, and he’s been quite extraordinary in terms 
of going around the country and meeting with judges in various 
different states, getting them on board as judicial advisors. We have a 
huge number of academic advisors, and we have some jury 
consultants who are advisors to this project. 
Now, as [an] academic, what I’m most excited about is that we 
have this academic arm of this project in which we can try to 
undertake some empirical research. Now, everything that you said, 
Stephen [Daniels], right up until the end about numbers not mattering, 
I think that there’s a little bit of a disconnect. There’s a large body, so, 
first of all, empirical studies aren’t going to resolve normative 
debates. But they can inform them, and there are certain myths that 
get purveyed where some of the empirical studies could be useful. 
Moreover—and Stephen you alluded to this—with respect to thinking 
particularly about empirical studies on the practical implications of 
caps, there are certain issues where there are empirical studies divided 
on both sides, and there’s convergence in certain areas. 
So I would take, for example, the impact on the elderly as there 
being remarkable convergence—different researchers have studied 
different data sets. Actually you’ll notice there’s a theme: Texas gets 
exploited. Now if you’re from Texas, or if you know people from 
Texas, they say that’s because everything’s better and bigger in 
Texas, and the way it should be—but it’s because of this closed-
claims data set that Stephen alluded to, which makes publically 
available insurance settlement data. That’s why that particular data, to 
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some extent in Illinois and Florida, gets mired. Because the problem 
is empirical researchers that are looking just at jury verdicts are only 
looking at the tip of the iceberg. But nonetheless, empirical scholars 
[are] coming at this issue from a variety of different directions, so 
looking at actual jury verdicts and trying to see what the impact of 
these have been as well as, well, I’m going to just quote a few 
statistics that come out of—Stephen alluded to this too—the massive 
research team that’s bringing together scholars from Northwestern 
[and the] University of Texas. 
They found, in looking at this Texas closed-claims data, that—they 
were looking there, Texas enacted the cap in 2003, and they were 
looking, doing a similar kind of natural experiment of sorts that 
Stephen was talking about what was happening before and after the 
cap—so just looking at the impact on the elderly, and the elderly are 
defined as sixty-four and older—uh every year I get closer to that I 
worry about that term “elderly.” We should say something like, “the 
wise” versus “the neophytes,” but in any event—it’s the elderly 
versus the nonelderly, and they looked at the mean per-case payout. 
So they found declines after the cap in both groups, but for the decline 
in the elderly it was thirty-six to forty-one percent of a decline, 
compared to a twenty-six to twenty-seven percent decline in the 
nonelderly. 
And there have been numerous other studies that have looked, not 
at this comprehensive dataset, but that have looked, for example, in 
California at published opinions before and after the cap, et cetera. 
One piece missing, and Stephen’s work[] really—he should tout 
himself a little bit more. Because he didn’t, I will—[what]’s really 
important is thinking about the plaintiffs’ attorney as gatekeeper and 
what happens in terms of the cases not brought. Because obviously 
any kind of a study that’s just looking at the impact in decided cases 
or settled cases is going to lose the cases that just drop out. And 
interestingly, when it comes to women, the empirical studies of what 
have happened in the verdicts and settlements are not as convergent 
as to the elderly, and I think a lot of the picture happens once you add 
Stephen’s work here with respect to case selection and which types of 
cases are coming forward. So it’s really piecing together empirical 
studies coming at the question from a variety of different 
perspectives. 
I think it can be enormously powerful, and I think that there are 
ways in which, for example, empirical scholars could look at 
particular issues and start collecting data. There are enormous 
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opportunities or experiments going on: how different state courts are 
handling things differently, innovative practices, et cetera, and 
empirical scholars can study these in a rigorous way and then use 
them to, you know, overcome other peoples’ fears or worries about 
enacting such things. So I believe that there’s a place for good 
empirical study. 
The second comment, though, that I wanted to make [is] about this 
ambivalence. So I agree that it’s there. I think there’s one piece of it, 
and it started to come out a little in our discussion about what’s the 
common law and what’s statutory intervention, and I, because I’m an 
academic, have to make things even more complicated. You know, 
we might think about, Guido Calabresi wrote a great book called 
Common Law in the Age of Statutes.3 And he wrote this book about 
how the common law in the nineteenth century was the be-all, end-all 
of law. And then he likes provocative words, so he talked about the 
orgy of statute-making that our country had seen, and I would add to 
that the regulatory sphere—who makes law today more than 
legislatures? Agencies. So we have common law in the age of statutes 
and regulations, and how do we figure out what the fabric of the 
common law is and how we should respond to that? I don’t have any 
quick, easy answers, but I think that that’s at the root, normatively, of 
many of the debates that were bubbling to the surface earlier today. 
The second—so those are the two comments that I have—the new 
issue, or it really was an issue that was on the table from the first 
panel, but it’s something that I’m fascinated by—has to do with how 
juries perceive their role, and how we, as a society, how courts 
perceive what the jury is doing in the realm of damages. So this was 
alluded to earlier by one of the panelists about—the comment was 
that the Oregon State Supreme Court seems to draw a sharp line 
between economic damages and noneconomic damages. And again, I 
would go further. I would say that we’re sort of obsessed with these 
doctrinal categories of economic, noneconomic, and punitive 
damages. And we have different kinds of restraints that are OK for 
some of those categories, and not others, and no really well-developed 
theories as to why and what we’re doing. And it behooves us, I think, 
at this juncture, to start developing those theories. So I became 
interested, for example, in looking around the country and thinking 
about something that we could look at empirically, with when 
jurisdictions were enacting punitive damages caps, what was 
 
3 GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1985). 
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happening to the noneconomic portion of damages? And there 
seemed to be some evidence that noneconomic damages were rising 
in jurisdictions where punitive damages were being depressed. 
And I became interested in whether in medical malpractice—so 
people would say yes, and in fact the U.S. Supreme Court (this 
happened after I started thinking and writing about this), but the U.S. 
Supreme Court has actually said there could be a punitive element in 
noneconomic damages, right, so they kind of started to push 
noneconomic toward punitive damages and away from 
economic/compensatory damages, not directly, but in their reasoning. 
But I become interested in whether, in medical malpractice cases—
because when I looked around at jurisdictions, some cases, some 
jurisdictions, a minority, capped total—economic and noneconomic—
but most jurisdictions just capped noneconomic. And I started 
becoming curious as to whether the economic component could be 
malleable, right. Jurors—some of the best evidence we have from 
some of the social psychologists and others who have looked at this—
tend to look at damages holistically. So it’s not surprising that there 
might be a substitutability. It’s not surprising that plaintiffs’ attorneys 
and defense attorneys are strategic actors: we heard a little bit about 
how the defense might act strategically before a jury, knowing that 
after the fact, a category of damages would be capped. And this same 
should be true of plaintiffs’ attorneys—knowing that you’re in a 
jurisdiction with punitive damages caps, but noneconomic, why not 
try to fashion arguments to buttress that category? 
And, in fact, there’s a history—if you look at the history of 
wrongful death damages in our country, wrongful death damages 
statutorily were very restrictive with respect to allowing for 
noneconomic, so what happened? Arguments were made to transform 
noneconomic types of harms into economic. What would it cost to 
pay an individual to do the types of services that before we were just 
calling pain and suffering, loss of quality of life, et cetera, et cetera? 
So I became interested in this kind of crossover effect—basically, 
whether it was happening—and then I think, for today’s purposes, if 
so, what does this mean about not only strategic responses but an 
issue that’s kind of just under the radar, and it’s just under the radar in 
the Horton case as well, which is disclosure to the jury.4 What kind of 
information do we want to give the jury about what it is that we’re 
asking them to do? And that includes caps. Actually, there are some 
 
4 Horton v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., 359 Or. 168, 376 P.3d 998 (2016). 
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jurisdictions where jurors can be told of caps. In Massachusetts, the 
defense counsel can specifically ask to have the cap given to the jury 
and then it goes into their determination. 
In other states—I’ve looked—and one of the reasons that they’ve 
upheld caps is because it’s specifically not disclosed to the jury. As if, 
if it were, that would be meddling with their fact-finding process, but 
this is not. Well that’s kind of interesting, right? So, as I reread, and 
this is actually true—I had this wonderful day where I had this 
inexplicably free day out here in Portland, because I live in New York 
and I was coming from a previous symposium in Los Angeles, so I 
went hiking in Forest Park, which was magnificent, and I brought 
Horton with me. And this hiker actually remarked as I was holding 
it—you know, I was in hiking clothes, and I was holding—and it’s 
this big decision, rolled up in one hand. And he’s like, “Hey, I have to 
ask,” because I’d stopped. I got up to Pittock Mansion, and I’d 
stopped up there—and he’s seen me, and he said, “I have to ask, what 
is that that you’re bringing? I’ve seen people bring books, et cetera.” I 
said, “Oh, it’s a decision of the Oregon State Supreme Court.” And at 
that point, you know, he didn’t really have further questions. 
So, these are two insights, though—so I looked at it more carefully, 
so I’m going to draw your attention to my learning. Footnote forty-
four of the majority opinion, which I’d missed before, and I couldn’t 
believe this, is really interesting to me. It says: “[F]rom the 
perspective of article I, section 17, the degree of interference with the 
jury’s verdict is the same regardless of whether the jury is informed of 
the limit in advance of its deliberations or the limit is imposed after 
the jury returns its verdict.”5 Wow, that’s interesting. And certainly 
many other jurisdictions that have upheld caps specifically because 
they weren’t disclosed to the jury seem to disagree with that. They 
seem to think that there’s something about giving that information 
that might intermeddle with what the jury’s doing, et cetera. So, I 
thought that was really interesting. 
And then, the second insight. And I’m hoping some of the real 
lawyers can shed light on this because I’m perplexed, and I’ve all-day 
been listening to try to see if this question would be answered. This is 
in the dissent. And again, the first time reading this through I had 
missed it. But Justice Walters finally actually gives us the instruction 
to the jury. Because in a lot of these debates I’m always asking 
myself, well what do we say to the jury? And what do we ask the jury 
 
5 Id. at 246 n.44, 376 P.3d at 1041–42 n.44. 
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to do when they’re doing this fact finding? And how do we describe 
what economic damages are and what noneconomic damages are and 
what punitive [damages] are? And in this case, she starts, and she tells 
us the instruction to the jury was, “[Y]ou must decide the amount of 
plaintiff’s damages . . . [the] plaintiff must prove economic and non-
economic damages by a preponderance of the evidence.”6 OK. And 
this part, this I’m really struggling—I’m just surprised by, “[T]he 
total amount of economic damages may not exceed the sum of 
$17,678,681.”7 That’s interesting—that’s a different limit, obviously, 
than any kind of cap on noneconomic or totals—and then “the amount 
of non-economic damages may not exceed the sum of $15 million.”8 
And then she goes on to say, in this case, the jury returned a verdict 
for plaintiff in the sum of $12 million.9 $12.071 million. So, this 
could be—and I mean, those can educate me—you know, we talked a 
little bit on the first panel about high-low agreements, et cetera. I’ve 
seen those. I understand those, but to disclose things like that to the 
jury and not worry about how that might affect their determination, 
and then have this cryptic footnote in the majority opinion about how, 
regardless of whether we tell them or not, the analysis is the same, I 
find bewildering. 
[Kathryn Clarke raises her hand from the audience and explains 
that, in Oregon, the jury is informed of the amount of damages 
alleged in the prayer for relief.] 
And do you always disclose that to the jury? So that’s, I mean, it’s 
interesting to me because in a lot of other jurisdictions they have all 
this fighting about whether or not those kinds of things will lead to 
anchoring, will interfere with what the jury’s doing, et cetera. And so 
my only point is not that that is so it’s great to learn why this is, but it 
should lead us to have questions about this issue of what we’re asking 
the jury to do and what kind of information we do or don’t want them 
to have. 
DAVE MILLER: I’m Dave Miller and have the distinction of being 
the reason why each and every one of you are here today. I had the 
pleasure, along with Maureen Leonard, of representing Tyson Horton 
and his parents, and I too went for a walk with the Horton opinion. It 
was not into the Forest Park. It was into the bathroom on May 5 of 
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last year. I got a phone call from a reporter, and it was early in the 
morning, and she said, “Dave, what do you think of the decision in 
Horton?” And I said, “Well, I didn’t even know it was out yet,” and 
she said, “Well, I’ll email you what I have because I don’t understand 
if you won or if you lost.” So it didn’t take me long to realize that we 
had lost, and so I telephoned my partner and I said, “Bob, I’ve got 
good news and bad news. The bad news is we lost Horton.” And he 
said, “Well, what good could possibly come from that,” and I said, 
“Well, we’re still open. We still have clients coming in the door.” 
And that’s remained the case. 
But I was asked to come to offer, along with my friend Gordy 
Welborn, a former partner and long-time defense lawyer, practical 
effects that we see of caps, and you’ve all seen them. And, in my 
simple mind, I liken it to a sports analogy. That you simply pick your 
favorite team, be it the Oregon Ducks or a baseball team, the little 
league team you’re coaching, perhaps, and they’re all out there trying 
their best, and you’re coaching the team that doesn’t have the nicest, 
fanciest uniform, maybe not from the best part of town, and you look 
across the way at the other team, like the Hart Wagner guys. They’re 
all dressed in expensive suits, and they’ve all got their new uniforms, 
and you know, their fancy snacks, and you say, “Boys, we have just 
as much chance to win as they do”—we put their pants on, or we put 
our pants on one leg at a time, just like they do, I think—and you get 
ready, and you give a big cheer, and you go out there. 
And then the umpire says, “Well, hold it—regardless of the 
number of runs your team scores, they’re not going to be charged 
more than five. So, go get ‘em!” And you have these kids looking at 
you like I have clients looking at me, saying what the hell is that? 
How come we don’t have the same chance that they have? And 
that’s the story that I tell clients because that’s how I feel about it. 
Because for me, and I think for most plaintiffs’ lawyers, it comes 
down to the people. I told Justice Walters before we spoke today 
that—and I meant it from the heart, and I’ll share it all with you—that 
when I sat and I read through the Horton opinion, and you can 
imagine the thoughts that went through my mind, I could barely spell 
quid pro quo, let alone understand it, and the context of sovereign 
immunity, and other things that trial lawyers don’t get to talk much 
about—but what I didn’t see in that lengthy opinion was the name, 
Tyson Horton. Not one time did the majority opinion mention the 
plaintiff by name, which I found to be reflective of a total disconnect 
between the practical impact of the cap on this family in the context 
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of a record that was also woefully referenced in the majority opinion. 
And so, I thought I’d just quickly get it off my chest. 
But one of the facts that was not mentioned, and it relates to 
Catherine [Sharkey]’s comment, and Kathryn [Clarke]’s correct 
pointing out that in Oregon we do allege a prayer of damages—we’re 
required to do so, and the jury’s informed about it—but one thing that 
most people don’t know is that in closing argument in that case, the 
Horton case, the defense counsel, one of Gordy’s partners, and they 
had their hands full because it was an admitted liability case, argued 
to the jury that OHSU believed Tyson Horton should be awarded 
eight million dollars. Now I’ve often thought, “Well, wait a minute, 
how can the institution tell a group of fact finders that they should 
award eight million dollars, when there is on the books a three-
million-dollar statutory cap, and get away with it?” To me that 
doesn’t seem fair to the people involved in the case. That was not 
mentioned in the majority opinion. 
The other, I think, very relevant consideration, and of course this 
wouldn’t ever be mentioned in front of the jury, but it was in the 
record, it became a part of the record during the middle of the trial 
when I stood up and moved to conform our economic damages claim 
up by four million dollars, and the trial judge, Jerry Hodson, 
appropriately said to defense counsel, well, outside the presence of 
the jury, before I grant that request, is that going to impact the 
defense, which lead to a recess, which led to a report back, that no, it 
does not affect the amount of liability insurance covering Tyson’s 
claim, which was thirty million. Again, a very practical side of the 
case that you don’t see reflected in the opinion, but there was in fact, 
despite the three-million-dollar cap, thirty million dollars of insurance 
coverage for Tyson’s case. 
The other things you don’t see in the Horton case, which is a very 
practical reality, and I think it applies to all of us that handle 
plaintiffs’ cases, be it a ten million case or a one million or whatever, 
you can’t view caps from our clients perspective in a vacuum—they 
don’t stand alone. In Tyson’s case, we took an advance payment at 
the beginning of three million dollars, which was the aggregate cap, 
which was in effect pursuant to the 2009 statute that was enacted. 
Also, interestingly I was asked to be part of the—[interruption from 
Mr. Welborn]—I was asked to be part of the group that got together 
and negotiated with OHSU—what should the cap be post-Clarke?10 
 
10 Clarke v. Oregon Health & Scis. Univ., 343 Or. 581, 175 P.3d 418 (2007). 
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And the negotiation was with Mike King helping us as mediator, and 
we sat down, and we came to the conclusion that a good aggregate 
cap would be three million bucks. That would take care of the vast 
majority of claims against OHSU. And a $1.5 million individual cap. 
And within days of that, Tyson Horton went into the operating room 
and effectively lost his liver. And so here we now had the first case 
really after that statute was then enacted that was going to challenge 
the sufficiency of that cap. 
But in any event, as we considered the advance payment, [and] 
agreed to accept it, where did the money go? You and I know where it 
went, but most people don’t know. Stanford, where Tyson incurred a 
bill of $4.5 million, took $1 million, to partially satisfy the remaining 
obligation. Health insurers took an additional $500,000. Those same 
health insurers required another half a million dollars to be put in a 
set-aside trust, in case Tyson needed a liver replacement—a second 
liver replacement. So, we’re now at—I’m losing track—2 million 
bucks. The remaining million dollars was set up in a fund to help 
Tyson with ongoing medical expenses into the future and to pay 
attorneys’ fees and costs. So again, practical aspect—or practical 
impact—of a $3 million cap has to be viewed in the context of health 
insurer liens, workers’ compensation interests, and other very real 
things. 
The other case I want to mention is a case that I filed before 
Horton, and that we settled not all that long ago, for a confidential 
sum, for Lowell Creasey. Lowell, being an eighty-two-year-old guy, 
retired accountant, who lived on the coast, and underwent, 
unfortunately, some spine surgery that did not go well. And Lowell 
now is in a walker and is incontinent of both urine and feces. Sadly, 
his medical expenses were about $100,000. Did he have any other 
economic loss at age eighty-two? No. Why? Because his wife of fifty 
years—a forty-year nurse, Birdie is her name—took care of her 
husband. They did not want to have anybody in the home caring for 
him. So, and of course we were spinning numbers left and right, 
trying to enhance the claim—as Catherine correctly says in her law 
review article of 2005,11 this whole notion of, I think you call it a 
crossover effect, you know I don’t think lawyers like me think in 
those terms, but it’s more how can we get the most we can get—but 
the practical effect of the Horton decision severely limited what we 
 
11 Catharine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice Damages 
Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391 (2005). 
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could recover for Lowell Creasey. And, I might add, that the defense 
argued that the $500,000 Horton cap also limited Birdie’s claim—in 
other words, both Birdie and Lowell combined were subject to a 
$500,000 cap. Now what’s the practical effect of that? I mean, as a 
trial lawyer you listen to that, and you say, “Well, forgive me, but you 
say bullshit—I’m not going to be hung by that.” And you look at an 
eighty-two-year-old client, sitting in a wheelchair, and say, “Let’s go 
to trial.” Well, you know, you don’t do that, because a guy that age 
probably would have shortened his life to go through all that, and we 
all know that. So, we settled the case for a confidential sum, and his 
son, Lowell’s son Don, who is a former in-house defense lawyer for 
Mission Insurance in the Midwest, was none too pleased, and a 
Republican with capital “R” in front of his name, was none too 
pleased about the effect of this cap and has made his feelings known 
in Salem. And [I] hope it had some positive effect. 
The third case I want to mention is really a collection of cases. My 
partner and I represented about eighteen to twenty people in a case 
involving one neurosurgeon. His name is James Makker. He’s no 
longer practicing in Oregon, thank God. Our clients were disabled as 
a result of spine surgeries that he performed. There were an additional 
twelve plaintiffs in addition to our group, and Dr. Makker was 
operating at Providence Hospital in a surgery center here in town with 
$3 million of liability coverage and a high-risk policy that took 
defense costs, attorneys’ fees—again, my friend Gordon’s firm—out 
of the $3 million in coverage. So we had an effective cap of—by the 
time we got all the cases settled—of around $2 million. Now, I’m 
representing some people who’d been operated [on] by Dr. Makker 
thirteen times. I represented two husband and wife couples who, all 
told, between those four people there, I think were sixteen different 
spinal operations. It was flagrant. It was written about finally in The 
Wall Street Journal, and I bring that up because these people were 
disabled—people going in—many of them disabled by on-the-job 
injuries, and when it came time to settle those cases, which we 
brought against Dr. Makker and Providence (we were able to 
establish a credentialing—negligent credentialing claim against the 
hospital), we spent most of our time dealing with the interests of the 
[workers’] comp carriers, the health insurers, and the others who were 
at the trough trying to get their money back. And this was in the 
setting, ladies and gentlemen, not of a surgeon who was in the 
mainstream—this was a surgeon who was on the edge and who has 
now fallen off the edge where he belongs. And so, at the end of the 
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day, some thirty people settled claims for sums that were not, frankly, 
enough money to compensate them. Not even close. Why? Well, 
again, because of the effective cap and the interests of the other third 
parties in the cases. 
So, the final thing I’m gonna say, and, at this point, is that we’ve 
all thought a lot about caps, and you know, I get that. I sort of 
understand the conversation across the fence with the neighbor, and 
they don’t understand it because you have to actually read a little bit 
to understand the effects of caps. But to me, caps do one thing in our 
business. And we are a business—we do work within a civil justice 
system that is based upon an adversarial component where one person 
wants something from somebody else. And if you take that business 
scenario—I don’t care what example you want to use—and you 
eliminate the element of risk on one side, the system doesn’t work. By 
eliminating risk, what’s to prevent the insurance carrier—well, we 
can only get whacked in this case for $750,000, let’s go! Let’s go try 
it. And that’s what happens. Talk to defense lawyers who do a lot of 
public body defense, as my partner did for many, many years, when 
the cap was low—$250,000 or whatever it was—and they will tell 
you, “Why offer the cap, when that’s the most you can possibly ever 
lose?” Why do that? And that’s the practical effect of these things. 
GORDON “GORDY” WELBORN: You know, this reminds me of 
over forty years ago. I went to high school here in this town, and we 
were getting ready to play a football game against our rival, and 
somebody burned our initials in the football field before the game. So 
the athletic director contacts me and says, “Hey, you know what, we 
need you to go over and calm things down at the high school and 
show that it’s not the football team that did this.” And so I talked to 
him, and I go in there, and they’re having the pep assembly. And I 
walk in and my jersey is actually hanging from the basketball rim 
when I went in there, and this is kind of like the room I’m in today . . . 
[Audience laughter.] 
It wasn’t burning! But I do remember, and I felt that same twinge 
as I listened. 
OK, the issues with caps, there’s only good thing about caps, and 
that’s for numbers crunchers, and insurance companies, and 
companies that are uninsured, to at least try to figure out, in some 
type of objective basis, what exposures are. When you take the cap 
out, then you’ve got this—you know, you’ve got a great lawyer like 
Dave [Miller], or the number of great lawyers in this room here—that 
can spin a great story, and get the emotions going, and you can get a 
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big number in there. And that’s where it’s difficult to actually 
evaluate what the damages are going to be worth. 
Now, that may not mean anything. Because there isn’t any, you 
know, you look at the constitution, [and] there’s no regulation about 
that. It just says give ‘em damages. But that’s at least one explanation 
for caps. I can’t give you a whole lot more other than that. 
You know, from our standpoint—I’ve been doing this for over 
thirty years solely as a defense lawyer—caps actually I think hurt 
people that are experienced trying cases from the defense side. 
Because if you have a cap out there, there’s no reason to hire good 
defense lawyers that have experience. And so when we have these 
cases out there that have caps, you know, they are risky cases or not 
very risky cases. It doesn’t matter. They’ll hire and have some in-
house lawyer go try these cases. So it actually kind of hurts our 
business, from our standpoint. 
There was something mentioned about gatekeepers. Gatekeepers 
are a big deal that I see from my side, where when we have caps out 
there, you have these cases come through, that the good lawyers, the 
people that, you know, I’ve got to hire three people, they’re going to 
be very expensive, to try this case, it’s going to be an expensive case, 
look at the exposure and what we can actually get out of the case—
they don’t take the cases. Well somebody does take the case. And 
that’s the people that don’t have any experience, don’t really have the 
funds to actually put on a good case, they still come to us. And we’re 
still trying those cases. Those are horrible to try. Because we still 
have to do everything [we] can, because we don’t know that they’re 
not going to have good experts, and with what we do in this state with 
trial by ambush—so we don’t have gatekeepers like you would if you 
didn’t have caps out there. People would be filing these lawsuits. So, 
you know, I deal with a lot of those cases, with the lawyers that don’t 
have a lot of experience trying these cases. 
So what I’ve seen from our standpoint, with cases with caps, is 
people really pushing the economic damages because you can start 
really working it to create your economic damage claim in the case to 
make it have some value. And that’s the issue that I see, at least in 
keeping the cases going. The $500,000 cap, you know, I can’t even 
admit it to anybody that that’s a reasonable number. It just doesn’t 
make any sense. 
But that’s what we have right now. We’ve had it for quite a while, 
and I’m not sure anything’s going to happen in Salem this time. 
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Maybe you guys know more than I do, but I don’t know about that.12 
So, from our standpoint, how many people last year tried a jury trial? 
[Some members of audience raise hands.] That’s not a lot of people in 
this room. You know, I look at it, [and] I tried four in 2015; last year I 
only tried one. I tried one this year, but you look around, and there are 
not a whole lot of cases getting tried. And so, as you know, if you’re 
dealing with medical malpractice cases—what, maybe ten defense 
lawyers, maybe, maybe ten or fifteen defense lawyers—in the state 
that are handling all of the cases. And then you start dealing with the 
scheduling that you all deal with. Yeah, you’ve got this one particular 
lawyer so you know you’re not going to have availability for twelve 
to eighteen months to get something going for these cases. There is 
one [positive] aspect [of] a cap—you might get some more people 
trying cases, and the docket may get a little bit better with respect to 
that. 
But otherwise, I can’t even support it. 
MILLER: So I have to say, I have to tell you—I didn’t have to 
strong-arm [Gordy Welborn] much to get him to come here. I mean, 
having done defense work for twenty years, I can tell you it’s the 
insurance companies paying your bill, and the insurance companies 
want to have caps because they want to save money. They want to 
make more profits. It’s that simple. So it takes somebody of the 
caliber of trial lawyer that this guy is [points to Gordy] to value the 
system’s interest more than his own, frankly, to come and speak 
honestly about something as controversial as caps. 
  
 
12 As of the date of this publication—and since the day of this symposium—the Oregon 
legislature has not passed any law impacting any existing statutory cap on damages. 
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